Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1973

Lubin v. Panish
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Powell, Lewis F. Jr., "Lubin v. Panish" (1973). Supreme Court Case Files. 564.
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/564

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~~~~

,.

~~

~ ~ rf c.4 · ~
~ '- ~
- ~~-41
1 r;fJ '1 ~-~ u-t ~
/f"l .__.
'-Y'
~

~_,&J... ~ - • .
~

~~. ~ •

~

-; _

L ~ ~ d,.

I

c.-e,..-c,.._._~·~
_.I

.-

.... ,.

I_., ~ , , . ".Ai'~ (/'171) ~~

,,..,~~4.~~~
.-...,,,..,AT.sz,c,._ ~ fu.- .

~ ~

1,-...,U~ ~ ~ ~

~~

~

~

k ;r4"'h./-r.(

te~--v'

,.~,.

~ -~'
"d

No. 71-1583
~ rA '14 W' ~ ~
No IC~Sflnt,Sf!
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Hamlin dissentin~.

-

Resp. was a candidate for Congress in California. Rxsxxk~ Cal.

law required that a fee of $425 must be paid in advance sf to entitle

-

-

resp. to a place on the ballot for the June primary election. That same
law provides that in every election, that a fee payable to the Secretary of State f~x for filing a declaration of candidacy shall be
1% of the first year's salary for xkxxxsffxEe the office sol!$ht, in
~

"

resµ. case $425. Res~. alleged he was an indigent, E~x:i:ax could not xffs
afford the fee and that the filing fee requirement xxs:i:xxea discriminated against indigents and axxx x disadvantaged persons in violation
of the equal portection clause . The three judge court upheld his claim
to the extent of issuing a preliminary injunction ~:gia.iu~x£~xxxi~

E:i:

fExkiia forbidding Cal. from collecting the fee for the primary. From

this judgment Cal . appeals.
In i ts opinion t he three ja ja«gR judge court relied heavily on
which you will remember i: x was kXRE handed down
by this Court in February. In ~ul~ock, the Supreme Court struck down
as vio1-ati.ve of the equal -protection «i:xi: clause

a Texas election

filing fee x~xxR~ system where fees ranged from $150 to as high as
$8900. The court below noted that in the instant case as in ~~llo~~,
the state made no showj_ng of some alternative method whereby a candidate who is unable to pay the filing fee can get on the ballot either
by nominating petition, primary election or pauper's affidavit. The
court further noted that the statute did not even tie the filing fee to

c..,s ....

1~~1 ol-

tA.t J

election costs or the cost of filing but arbitrarily to the office

sought. The court below found the same discrimination against indigents
as in Bullock xk and ventured that all state filing R fees had to be
governed by a compeeli.ng state interest test used in Harper(the poll

--

tax case) Rand not by a milder rational basis t ~st.
California disputes the majorities approach. g Petrs note
that there is language in Bulloc~ which Rmtt-kxix emphasizes that "nothing
herein is ~ended to cast doubt on the xxxi:i: validity of reasonable
candidate filing fees or licensing fees in other contexts." The kxxi:
above

1.

anguage was the basis for Judge Hamlin's dissent which noted that

I

REXki:R~ no showing had been made that the Cal. fee was unreasonable.

The unfortunate thing is that Bullock is an« ambiguous decision which leaves room for differing interpretations on ..t.atc ii?isj ice,;
DiEkXEXXEl

,.
the validity of state filing fees which of course happened in the court
below. However, I would say that the majority's interpretation finds
more support in Bullock than Judge Hamlin's dissent. The fact that
no alternative menas of

getting on the ballot is provmded by
fee is great.er than some of those in
I

Cal ..S a tough case. As a matter of

But I would say that state filing fees can represent quite
'

legitimate state interests, including defraying the costs of filing and

exEexxsxxxaxs costs of elections as well as x:imxxxgxax½sxxs£ keeping
the number of candidates onx the ballot to a reasonable number. Thus,
I would favor a rule which would allow state filing fees of less than
outrageous amounts. But it would be unwi~to rexamine Bul_lock so soon
a£zezz:i;zsz!'
and until the time comes to draw back on that decison, I would

AFFIRM

JHW

DISCUSS
No. 71-6852
Lubin v . Alliason
Cert to Cal. Sup. Ct.
Petr asks that the Registrar of Los Angeles County be required
to process his nomination papers for his candidacy for the Board
of Suuervisors without payment of the $700 £ix filing fee. He claims
indigency and that the £i.xi.n£x:e.x filing fee xi.sax violates the rights'
of indigents under the equal protection clause. I have discussed this
question at length in my cert note a£ on Brown v. Chote, No. 71-1583.
The RH questions are substantially i.a:e.ni.xERX identical.
FOLLOW DISPOSITION IN BROWN V. CHOTE, N0 . 71-1583
JHW

Con£. 10/2/72
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10/12/72--LAH

/IEJ-IJ tS
No. 71-1583 OT 1972
Brown v. Chote
Appeal from USDC ND Calif
No. 71'-lsireli. OT 1~1]2 ._'. "! .
Norvell v. Apodaca
Appeal from New Mex SC
No. 71-1512 OT 1972
Brown v. Apodaca
Cert

,J-JA

No. 12-193 OT 1972
Fowler v. Culbertson
Appeal from USDC D South

DISCUSS

No. 71-6852 OT 1972
Lubin v. Allison
Cert to Calif SC
Attached are the cert notes in each of these filing
fee cases which have been relisted for reconsideration
together.

These cases all grow out of the uncertainties of

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).

Two of them are

state appeals from primary filing fees which were struck
down by federal courts and two others are appeals by dis"
appointed plaintiffs who unsuccessfully attacked state fee

--2--

requirements.
(1) Brown v. Chote is the decision by a federal threejudge ct striking down the California requirement that a
candidate for Congress pay 1% of the salary of a Congress"
man ($425.00) to get on the primary ballot.

There is no

alternative to the fee,
(2)

Norvell v. Apodaca

is a decision by the New

Mexico SC upholding the State primary filing fee requirement
that every candidate pay in 6 % of the salary of the office
he is seeking.

One-half of that amonnt will be refunded

if the candidate polls at least 15% of the voters.

For a

candidate for Congress this requires an initial outlay of
$2550.

Again, there is no alternative in New Mexico to

paying the fee,

(Jay has not written a note on 1$12--Brown

v. Apodaca but I have received a copy of the papers.

I think

it may be helpful to take a look at the standing issue that
appears to bother Jay.

As you know a federal three-judge

ct held last March that New Mexico could not enforece its
filing fee requirement to candidates for U.S. Senate from
having their names placed on the ballot.
did not appeal that judgment.

The State AG

Thereafter he issued a memo

order to the State Sec of State ordering that she not
assess filing fees under the statute.

An official acting on

behalf of the State then brought a mandamus action against
the AG seeking an order from the N.Mex SC that his order be
rescinded and thatcandidates be ordered to comply with the
filing requirement.

The SC of NMEx agreed and issued a

mandamus order instructing the AG and Sec of State to
strike the names of any candidates who would not comply with

--3--

fee requirement.
judgment.

The AG appeals in No 71-1511 from that

Under these circumstances I do not think that there

is a serious standing questions the State AG is subject to
comply with an order that he thinks is unconstitutional.

I

have never heard of a civil case in which an injunction was
entered against the defendant but he was not allowed to
appeal.

No 71-1512 is a cert petn filed by candidates who

sought to intervene in the state ct but were refused.

Their

case presents an attenuated version of the case since they
must first persuade the ct that it was a denial of due process
for the ct bel0lw

mot to have allowed them to intervene.

I doubt eeriously whether Petrs can succeed.

Therefore,

although your conference notes seem to indicate a different
view, I would think that the case to grant is 1511 and that
1512 should simply be held.)
(3)

Fowler v. Culbertson

is a three judge ct decision

from Soulth Carolina which struck down that State 0 s filing
fee requirement for party primaries.

There a state senate

candidate was unable to pay $500 and a state candidate for
U.S. Senate was unable to pay a $4,000 fee.
(4)

Lubin v. Allison is a Calif state decision up-

holding a $700 filing fee for candidacy in the Bd of Supervisprs race in Las Angeles County.

I know nothing more

about this case other than what is in Jay 0 s cert petn.
RECOMMENDATION
It is my judgment--in agreement with Jay 0 s--that the
Ct must do something about the Norvell case.

It must be

either summarily reversed or granted for clarification and
reversed. I lean toward the latter alternative since the
raw numbers fo filing fee questions that are coming up

--4--

is indicative that the Bullock opinion needs to be explained.
I would note No. 71-1511 and hold the other cases pending
decision.

You should 9 of course, await the views of both the

CJ and Justice White since each has peculiar expertise in
this area.
NOTE 71-1511 & HOLD OTHERS

LAH

Con.£. 10/13/72
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned . . ................ , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

RELIST

LUBIN
vs.

ALLISON

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

Rehnquist, J ................. .
Powell, J .................... .
Blackmun, J ................. .
Marshall, J . ................. .
White, J ..................... .
Stewart, J ................... .
Brennan, J................... .
Douglas, J .......... .......... .

Burger, Ch. J . ............... .

D

JURISDICTION AL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DIS

No. 71-6852

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

AB-

NOT
VOTSENT ING

...
7

Notes on No. 71"1583
Brown v. Chote
\\CK

February 21, 1973
The question posed by this case is whether
California's requirement that a candidate for
the United States Congress must pay a $425 filing
fee to enter a party primary election is constitutional.
The central precedent is of course Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134(1972), although our discussiorsof voting
in Rodriguez and Rosario are at least tangentially
relevant.
Unfortunately, the opinion in Bullock is hardly
a model of clarity.

The language is a potpourri of

everyone's views on equal protection.

Perhaps the

best place to start is with the facts of that case.
The filing fees there ranged from $150 to $8900,
depending upon the office for which the cancfidate
was running.

There, as here 0 the fees were levied

on all who wished to run in the primary.

Texas

afforded no alternative avenue to the paying of the
filing fee"~that is, Texas did not allow a cnadidate
to place his name on the ballot by amassing some
number of signatures on a nominating petition.
In striking down the Texas scheme, the Court
identified as possible state interests the raising of
revenue(or saving of expenses) and the elimination of
frivolous candidacies.

As to the first, the Court

fo~nd that the state could not constitutionally
\ finance tahe primary elections through filing fees •

.. 2 ..

"Appellants seem to place reliance on the selfevident fact that if the State must assume the
cost, the voters, as taxpayers, will ultimat:Eiy
be burdened with the expense of the primaries.
But it is far too late to make out a case
that the party primary ys such a lesser part
of the democratic process that its cost must
be shifted away from the taxpayers generally.
]he financial burden for general elections
is carried by all taxpayers and appellants have
not demonstrated a valid basis for distinguishing
betweenthese two legitimate costs of the
democratic process." at 148.
At the same time, the Court did not go the whole route,
compare Harper, to say that the state had no financial
interest.
/I
1'

I\

"It must be emphasized that nothing herein
is intended to cast doubt on the validity
of reasonable candidate filing fees • • • • "
at 149 •

This passage is illuminted by footnote 29, at 1481
This would be a different case if the fees
approximated the cost of processing a candidate 0 s
application for a place on the ballot, a cost
resulting from the candidate's decision to
enter a primary. The term filing fee has long
been thought to cover the cost of filing, that
is, the cost of placing a particular document
on the public record."
In sum, as I read Bullock, the dictum in that case
allows the state to vindicate it financial interest
only to the extent of covering minor administ•rative
costs, perhaps a few dollars or even up to, sayJ
$40 or $50.
I

The state.5 other interest in Bullock was the
m,ore complicated one of protecting "the integrity of
its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent

-3-

candidacies." at 145.

While recogni•zing that of course

high fili8ng fees have some deterrent effect, the
Court found that the state's means were insufficiently
well tailored to its end•.

The means were both

overinclusive, in the sense of precluding poor but
serious candidates from running, and underinclusive,
in that "even assuming that every person paying the
large fees required by Texas law. takes his own
canddacy seriously, that does not make him a
11

serious candidate' in the popular sense." at 146.
I think that Bullock could well be read to

stand for the proposition that• a state may simply
not use financial deterrence as a means of eliminating
frivolous candidacies.

Indeed, I do not think that

.•,

there is support in the te•x~ of the opinion for any
other reading.

However, the Court did note that

Texas afforded no other means of access to the
primary ballot, presumably leaving open the question
~h•I-Ri: whether the state could force those unable to

pay a filing fee

a

to submit a petition with

signatures.
In the present case, I do not think that the
fee charged by California, here $425, is a filing
fee as defined in footnote 29 of the Chief's opinion
in Bullock, see supra.

$425 is surely more than

the "cost of placing a particular document on the
public record~

'·

-4-

Nor, for the reasons sketched above, do I
think that the filing fee may be used as a deterrent.
Apart from the fact that it may be an absolute bar
to some, it is bound to have a differential effect

,
A

on prospective candidates according to their wealth.
The fee here, - - $425, is greater than the

a

lowest fee held unconstitutional in Bullock, $150.
It is no answer, I think, that the profu,ects
for a successful candidacy are powerfully influenced
by one 0 s personal wealth and that of his friends
and associates.

This is a pervasive fact of our

economic and political system, but not one directly
decreed by government.

The filing fee, on the other

hand, is directly prescribed by California and
augments the disparity of resources between the
wealthy and the poor.

And while of course the

poor or middle income candidate may benefit from
the support of a party or union or association,
this is more likeG to be true in a general election
than in a primary.

If the right to vote for

a candidate of one ' s choice is indeed preservative
of other rights, then a state ought not to erect an
irrelevant barrier to the opportunity to run for public
office.

I would affirm, leaving open what would

bappen if a state afforded an alternative means
for obtaining a place on the ballot.

!

CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 71-1583 - Brown v. Chote and "Hold" cases

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

We have all been aware that our "hold" cases on Brown v.
Chote, may include a case to treat the basic question sought to be
raised relating to election filing fees. Here is a summary of each
case we are presently holding for Brown v. Chote:
(1) No. 71-1511 -- Norvell v. Apodaca -- Appeal to the
New Mexico Supreme Court. Under the New Mexico filing fee system,
a candidate must pay 6% of the first year salary of the office which he
seeks in order to gain entrance to the primary election. For example,
the fee for U:nited States Senator is $2,550. If the candidate receives
15% of the electoral vote, one-half of the fee is refunded. The fees
not refunded pay for part of the costs of the election. (This is much
like the British system that has worked so well.)
After a decision of a Three-Judge Court, District Court for
the District of New Mexico, holding part of the filing fee system unconstitutional, the New Mexico Secretary of State issued an opinion, stating
that all New Mexico filing fees were unconstitutional. A candidate for
office then filed a petition for a "Writ of Mandate II in the New Mexico
Supreme Court, asking that the Secretary of State be required to strike
the names of all primary candidates who had not paid the fees. Defining
a serious candidate as one who could gain 15% of the electoral vote, the
New Mexico Supreme Court found as a fact that no serious candidate had
ever been prevented by the fees charged from running for office. Since
the fees were thus reasonable, and were related to legitimate state
purposes (eleiminating overcrowded ballots and frivolous candidates),
the, Court held that they were constitutional.

-2-

The name party in the above case was the Secretary of State.
She did not appeal to this Court but this appeal was filed by the Attorney
General of New Mexico, who had represented the Secretary of State and
who had specifically been enjoined by the New Mexico Supreme Court from
issuing an advisory opinion which conflicted with the New Mexico Supreme
Court decision.
(2) No. 71-1512 -- Brown v. Apodaca -- Certiorari to New
Mexico Supreme Court. Petitioners wished to become candidates in a
New Mexico primary election. When the New Mexico Supreme Court
accepted jurisdiction in Norvell v. Apodaca, petitioners moved to intervene. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied them leave to intervene
without opinion. Petitioners ask this Court to determine (a) whether they
were denied due process when they were denied leave to intervene; (b)
whether petitioners now have standing to appeal from the decision in
Norvell v. Apodaca; and (c) whether the New Mexico filing fee system
is unconstitutional.
(3) No. 71-6852 -- ~,ubin v. Allison (Registrar of Los Angeles
County) -- Cert. to· California Supreme Court. The filing fee system
challenged here is precisely the same statutory system challenged in
Brown v. Chote. However, whereas Brown v. Chote covered only statewide offices, this suit challenged the validity of the fees as applied to ~
lesser state offices. The fees charged in California are either 1% or
2% of the first year salary of the office sought.
/
Petitioner, who is indigent, wished to run for the Board of
Supervisors of Los Angeles County. Respondent refused to issue to
petitioner a set of blank registration forms unless petitioner first
presented a check for $701. 60. Petitioner filed a petition for a Writ
of Mandate in California Superior Court, asking that he and members
of his class be allowed to register without paying the required fees. On
demurrer, the Superior Court held that the State had a legitimate objective in preventing fraudulent or frivolous candidates from running for
office and that the amount of the fees charged was reasonable "as a
matter of law. 11 Since the fees were reasonable, the court held that
the State need not provide an alternative means of gaining access to
the ballot. Subsequent petitions for a Writ of Mandate to the California
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court were denied.

______

...

..,_.......,.,..,...,,,..,....\

_____

-""' ....,.

,.,.,,

__

.,.,._.,..__.,.,...

......,..,
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(4) No. 72-193 - - Fowler (South Carolina Democratic Party)
v. Culbertson - - Appeal to Three-Judge Court, District Court for t h e ~
District of South Carolina (Craven, Russell, Simons). Under South
Carolina law, a candidate who wishes to run in a primary election
must file a declaration of candidacy. At that time, he must pay a fee lJ,I'/
of $500. The candidate may also be assessed by the political party
l 1
in whose primary he wishes to run. The amount of the assessment
\ -~
is left to the discretion of the political party; according to the D i s t r i c t ~ /
Court, the total fees charged range from $500 to $5,000. The fees
are paid to the political parties, to be used as they wish. This is
closer to Bullock than other cases.

1·

Appellee, who wished to be a primary candidate for United
States Senator, filed this action, challenging the South Carolina filing
fee system. The District Court ruled that $850 was the maximum
permissible fee which could be charged under the Constitution. Appellant
was ordered to adjust other fees downward, so as not to exceed 2% of the
annual salary of the office sought. The District Court also ruled that
indigents could become candidates without paying any fee and that excess
fees paid to political parties had to be returned. Having determined that
an injunction should issue , the Three-Judge Court dissolved itself and
returned jurisdiction to a single district court for further proceedings.
Appellant argues that the District Court acted improperly in
granting relief before evidence was taken or an answer to the complaint
filed. He further contends that the court did not know the range of fees
charged inSouth Carolina.
1

(J .\

(5) No. 72-455 -- Bush v. Sebesta (Fla.) -- Appeal to T h r e e - ~Judge Court, District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Roney,
Krentzman, Hodges). Florida requires candidates in primary elections
for state salaried offices to pay 5% of the first year salary of the office
to have their names placed on the ballot. Approximately 80% of the fees
charged are paid by the State to the political parties, to be spent as the
parties wish. The remainder is paid into the state treasury.
This class action, challenging the Florida filing fee system,
was filed by Miranda. Appellant Bush, who is indigent, intervened.
To run for the office he sought, appellant would have had to pay $600 •

... . -

- 4 -

The District Court held that a filing fee of 5% was reasonable. However,
it also ruled that the State had to provide some alternative means by
which indigent candidates could gain access to the ballot. Since an election
was about to take pl ace, the District Court established "interim standards"
for the qualification of indigent candidates: (a) those who wished to run for
state-wide offices had to secure 10,000 signatures from qualified voters;
(b) those running for other offices had to secure the signatures of 1 % of
1/
the qualified voters, but not . more than 3,000 nor less than 100 signatures:The sur:rrn.ary order of the District Court notes that a full opinion will
follow. Appellant contends that the District Court should have struck down
the entire Florida filing fee system, rather than provide an alternative
means for indigents to gain access to the ballot. Apparently, part of
appellant's argument relates to the fact that fees collected in Florida
go to the political parties for whatever use they choose.
(6) No. 72-5187 -- Fair v. Taylor -- (Three-Judge Court,
District Coµrt for the Middle District of Florida). This case was con- ~
solidated by the District Court with Bush v. Sebesta. Appellant is well, I ~
known in the Clerk's office in our Court since he has filed some 31
~
previous £!.£ l l petitions and appeals. His petition is difficult to decipher.
The Clerk's office informs me that appellant is presently confined to a
mental institution in Florida.
Although in most cases above, it is clear that the courts acted
on "11th hour" cases and had to respond quickly in the face of approaching
deadlines, it is not at all clear that relief granted was intended to be of a
strictly interim nature. If we can find a case in this motley collection we
should probably drop a note in Brown that we are taking a case on this
subject.
Regards,

5
l/

This alternative plan was suggested by appellee (the State).

To date, ~the District Court has filed no op1ruon. The Clerk's office
has been ad~ised that an opinion may be filed sho:i;tly.

(Slip Opinion)

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will he released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time
the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

BROWN v. CHOTE

6

the District Court's swift action is understandable in view
of the deadline which it faced, the resulting record was
simply insufficient to allow that court to consider fully
the grave, far-reaching constitutional questions presented.
The specific deadline which led the District Court to
grant equitable relief has now passed.4 Nothing precludes appellee from seeking a trial on the merits, if he
chooses to proceed. The case is therefore remanded to
the District Court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. 5
Remanded for further proceedings.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi

I

Syllabus

BROWN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF
CALIFORNIA v. CHOTE
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 71-1583. Argued February 22, 1973-Decided May 7, 1973
Appellee, who sought to run for Congress but asserted that he was
unable to pay California's statutory filing fee, filed a class action
in District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the filing-fee
statutes. In the face of an impending filing deadline, the District
Court granted appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Held: Given the possibility that appellee would prevail on the
merits and the fact that appellee's opportunity to be a candidate
would have been foreclosed absent interim relief, the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction.
Pp. 4-6.
342 F. Supp. 1353, affirmed and remanded.
BURGER,

4

Although the June 6 primary election has passed, the question
raised is one "capable of repitition, yet evading review." Consequently, the case is not moot. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18, slip opinion, at 10 (1973).
5
We have granted certiorari in No. 71-6852, Lubin v. Allison, in
order to consider conflicts in holdings regarding the constitutionality
of state filing fee statutes.

I

C. J. , delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

NOTICE: This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publlcatlon
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-1583
T

in

.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Secretary of State of California, On Appeal from the
United States District
Appellant,
Court for the Northern
V.
District of California.
Raymond G. Chote.
[May 7, 1973]
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
This case arises under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 on direct appeal from a three-judge district court in the Northern
District of California. The court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 when appellee called into
question the constitutionality of those provisions of the
California Elections Code which require candidates in a
primary election to pay a filing fee prior to having their
names listed on the primary ballot. _ Calif. Elections
Code §§ 6552 and 6553. Under these provisions, candidates for the federal House of Representatives must pay
$425 ( 1% of the annual salary of the office) ; candidates
for the federal Senate must pay $850 (2% of the salary of
the office). Those wishing to run for statewide offices
must pay similar fees ranging in amount from $192 for
State Assemblyman ( 1 % of the annual salary) to $982
for Governor (2% of the annual salary). Other portions
of the California Elections Code, not challenged in the
present suit, require prospective candidates to file with
appropriate state officials a declaration of candidacy and
sponsor certificates. Calif. Elections Code §§ 6490-6491,
6494--6495.
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Appellee commenced this class action on March 3, 1972.
He moved and w~ granted permission by a single district
judge to proceed in forma pauperis and as his own attorney. In his complaint, appellee asserted that he
wished to become a candidate for the federal House of
Representatives from the 17th District of California, and
had taken the following steps to place his name in nomination in the June 6, 1972, California primary election.
On February 17, 1972, appellee called the Registrar of
Voters of Santa Cla;ra County, an official designated by
state law to dispense those forms necessary to place a
name in nomination. Appellee was purportedly told by
the Registrar or a member of his office that he was required to pay $425 in advance in order to secure blank
copies of the necessary papers. According to appellee,
the Registrar's Office also advised him that the papers
would be delivered in exchange for a worthless check.1
Appellee proceeded immediately to the Registrar's Office where he presented a personal check for $425 and
requested copies of the necessary forms. Across the face
of the check, appellee had typed "Written under protest
for filing fee." 2 The Registrar issued the requisite papers
to appellee and informed him that his check would be forwarded to the California Secretary of State when his com-

pleted papers were submitted. Subsequently, a Deputy
Secretary of State informed appellee that his name would
not be placed on the ballot if his check was not honored. 3
Citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), appellee asserted that California's filing fee system was unconstitutional since it barred indigents, such as himself,
from seeking elective office and from voting for the candidate of his or her choice. In addition to requesting
declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, appellee
moved the District Court to issue a preliminary injunction so as to allow him to participate as a candidate in
the upcoming primary. Under state law, the final date
on which appellee could submit nominating papers for
that primary was March 10, 1972, one week away.
Because of the impending filing deadline, the District
Court proceeded quickly to set the case for argument.
On March 3, 1972, the same date on which the suit was
filed, the single District Judge to whom the case was
assigned entered an order requiring appellant to show
cause why interlocutory relief should not be granted.
The State was given five days in which to respond. It
was not until March 7 that the Chief Judge of the Ninth
Circuit was notified of the application for a three judge
court. On March 8, he designated the judges who were
to comprise the panel. On the same day, the court convened and heard oral argument. Because of the speed
with which the case had developed, neither the court nor
appellee had an opportunity prior to the hearing to
consider appellant's return to the order to show cause,
the only paper which the State had been able to prepare.
On March 9, 1972, one day after oral argument and
one day before the deadline for filing nomination papers,

2

1
The State denies that such advice was ever communicated to
appellee. In an affidavit submitted to the District Court, the Registrar of Voters of Santa Clara County stated that it was the policy
of his office not to distribute the required forms to anyone who represented to the Registrar that the check submitted was worthless.
The Registrar further stated that, to his knowledge, neither he nor
anyone in his office had ever informed appellee that forms would
be issued upon presentation of a worthless check.
2
When the case was argued before the District Court, appellee
claimed that he had also told the Registrar or a member of his
office that the account on which the check was drawn did not contain sufficient funds to cover it. However, this fact is not alleged
in the complaint.

l

3

3
Appellant submitted to the District Court an affidavit from the
Deputy Secretary of State to whom appellee had spoken, disputing
appellee's claim that he had been informed that his name would not
be placed on the ballot if his check was not honored.
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the District Court granted appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction-, stating:
"Since no . . . showing has been made by the
state concerning either the necessity, the purpose of
the reasonableness of the filing fee statutes in question, we conclude that within the rationale of Bullock [v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972)], plaintiff may
prevail on the merits and that, absent a preliminary
injunction, his constitutional right may be irreparably lost." (Emphasis added.)

In the present posture of the case, there is no occasion to

4

Under the terms of the preliminary injunction, the State
was required to allow appellee and others similarly situated to place their names on the ballot without paying
the required fee, so long as they were otherwise eligible
for the applicable state or federal office and had deposited
with an appropriate state official an affidavit attesting
to their indigency.
The State appealed directly to this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1253. Its Jurisdictional Statement posed two
questions:
"Under the decision of this Court in Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U. S. 134 ( 1972), when a state statute
requiring a candidate's filing fee of one per cent
( 1%) of the first years salary for the office is challenged on Equal Protection grounds does the 'rational basis' or 'close scrutiny' standard of judicial
review apply?
"Do California Election Code sections 6552 and
6553 deny voters or indigent prospective candidates
equal protection of the laws?"
Thus, the State of California, for reasons not clear to us
in light of the limited record, asked the Court to address
itself to the ultimate merits of appellee's constitutional
claim, a question which the District Court did not reach.

5

consider any issues beyond those addressed by the District Court.
The issuance of the requested preliminary injunction
was the only action taken by the District Court. In determining whether such relief was required, that court
properly addressed itself to two relevant factors: first,
the appellee's possibilities of success on the merits; and
second, the possibility that irreparable injury would have
resulted absent interlocutory relief. As the District Court
opinion clearly evidences, issuance of the injunction reflected the balance which that court reached in weighing
these factors and was not in any sense intended as a final
decision as to the constitutionality of the challenged statute. In the exigent circumstances, the grant of extraordinary interim relief was a permissible choice; but on
the very limited record before the District Court a decision on the merits would not have been appropriate.
In reviewing such interlocutory relief, this Court may
only consider whether issuance of the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion. State of Alabama v. United
States, 279 U. S. 229 (1929); United States v. Corrick,
298 U. S. 435 (1936); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission of West Virginia, 278 U. S. 322
(1929); National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v.
Thompson, 281 U. S. 331 (1930). In light of the arguments presented by appellee and the fact that appellee's
opportunity to be a candidate would have been foreclosed
absent some relief, we cannot conclude that the court's
action was an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm
the action taken by the District Court in granting interim
relief.
In doing so, we intimate no view as to the ultimate
merits of appellee's contentions. The record in this case
clearly reflects the limited time which the parties had to
assemble evidence and prepare their arguments. While

.,
''
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No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish, RegistrarRecorder, County of Los Angeles
Summer Memorandum
This is a brief memorandum dictated after having
read most of the briefs.

It is entirely preliminary and,

in large degree superficial.

Further study is indicated.

Statement of the Case
This is the case we granted last spring at the time
we handed down Brown v. Chote - May 7, 1973.

We took the case

in order to reach the substantive issues raised in Chote.
These issues relate to the validity of California
election laws which require the payment by all candidates for
federal state and local offices of filing fees (ranging from
1 to 2% of the salary of the office sought).

This petitioner,

Lubin, sought to run for the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles
County, and claimed he was unable to pay the filing fee of

$701 . 60 .

He then filed this class action, attacking the

California system as being invalid because it created a
classificsition based on wealth (denying "poor people the right
to seek public office solely because of their economic station"),
denies petitions and members of his class the opportunity to
vote for candidates of their choice.
In arguing these points, petitioner relies heavily
on his contention that California "provides no alternative to

2.

the f i ling fee requirement" (p . 5, 12, 13 of petitioner's brief) .
In this connection, petitioner relies on Bullock v . Carter in
which the Court referred to the absence under Texas law of an
alternative means of qualifying, for example, "by way of
petitioning voters and write - in votes " - neither of which was
permitted in Texas .
The state does not contest the holding in Bullock that
the compelling state interest test is applicable .

Rather, it

asserts that California does have a compelling interest, that
the fee is a modest requirement to demonstrate the good faith
of the candidate and also that he has a modicum of support .
Comment
As these questions were argued and considered - but
did not form the basis of our opinion - in Chote, no further
elaboration is necessary in this memorandum .
I am asking Sally - by this reference - to put the
Chote file and the file on this case is a single large red
folder so that I will have both files before me .

~
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I find this a confusing case. The difficulty largely stems
from Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). There the Court
purportedly decided whether filing fee restrictions on aspirants to
public office must be subjected to strict scrutiny. In a baffling passage,

----

I {

the Court said that the Texas scheme implicated tl].e right to vote as
~

------,,

-

well as the right to be a candidate:
"The initial and direct impact of filing f'ees is
felt by aspirants for office, rather than voters, and the
Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental
status to condidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review. However, the rights of voters and the rights
of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation;
laws that affect candidates always have some theoretical
correlative, effect on voters. Id.,at 142-43."
If right to vote is equated with freedom of choice, it may well be that

restrictions on candidacy burden that right. A voter may wish to cast
his ballot for an indigent who cannot pay the filing fees, or for an
y:
ill'iterate who cannot qualify to stand, or for an alien. These factors
and others that have nothing to do with governmental regulation, ~. g. ,
who chooses to run, may limit a voter's range of choice. To my mind,

,.

2.

( these restrictions on candidacy do not sufficiently implicate the
;ight to vote to justify the strict scrutiny usually associate~

l ------------- --- ---

ith st'.'1e

classifications that burden a fundamental right.
One may also argue that the filing-fee restrictions on candidates

involve a wealth classification among voters. This argument is founded
on the hypothetical case of an utterly indigent candidate with equally
destitute supporters. The aspirant cannot run, and his supporters
are thus denied the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice
because they cannot afford to pay his fees for him. I think this is an
unreal case. The class of voters who cannot afford to pay the fees of
their candidate need not be composed entirely of poor persons. A non-

. . " , . - ---------- - =----=---------_;,_-

indigent but nQ!: wealthy voter may be unable to pay the entire fee re uired
~

by a would-be _<:__a ndidate without other solvent backers. In any event,
there is no way to establish the indigency of a candidate's supporters."I ~
Realistically, aspirants to local office may have no supporting group
in advance of formal candidacy. Therefore, I do not believe that filij
fee restrictions on candidacy can be said to establish a wealth

1
~~

'·

classification among voters. The determinative criterion must be the

I

i ~ f the ~ould-be candidat~ rather than the financial position

I

\ of his supporters.

<
\,

·.

3.
Bullock v. Carter dealt with the Texas system in terms of

,·
strict review:
"Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a
real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the
franchise, and because this impact is related to the
resources of the voters supporting a particular
candidate, we conclude, as in Harper, that the laws
must be "closely scrutinized" and found reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state
objectives in order to pass constitutional muster.
Id., at 144"
In addition to the unusual phrasing of the test ("reasonably necessary"),
this pronouncement is hedged by confusing qualifications. I would not
treat Bullock as establishing that a citizen's interest in becoming a
candidate for public office is a fundamental one for purposes of equal
protection analysis. The state's interest in restricting access to the
ballot so that the real choices are not obscured b a long list of frivolous
candidates seems to me perfectly legitimate. It would be unwise to
subject the myriad restrictions surrounding candidacy to the exacting
scrutiny that would follow if the right to be a candidate were announced
as fundamental.
Finally, I come to the way I think you should view this case. I
think the question is whether California's scheme creates an i1*idious
wealth classification among aspirants for office. In Rodriguez, you

4.
stated the two distinguishing characteristics:
"because of their impecunity they were completely
unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
consequence they sustained an absolute deprivation
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit."
411 U.S. 1, 20."
Whether the California scheme meets these requirements is a close
question. Clearly the second half of the test is satisfied. The
aspirant to public office who cannot raise the necessary funds is
absolutely denied the opportunity to appear on the primary ballot. The
first condition is more difficult. A would-be candidate without significant
support has no legitimate interest in appearing on the ballot. If you
are willing to add that any serious candidate could raise $701, then this
is not a suspect wealth classification. On the other hand, one could
argue that a serious candidate could be unable to raise the fees required
in California. This seems especially plausible in the context of local
elections in which supporting groups do not normally coalesce in advance
of formal candidacy. Thus an indigent aspirant could be completely
u ~ p a y . While this is not clear one way or another, I inc line
l!f.was

-

to the latter view.
If you ~.nrude that no suspect classification is involved, then

the matter is at an end. If, however, you decide that the California
scheme does discriminate among would-be candidates on the basis of

5.
wealth, you must confront some subsidiary issues. California
could save its system by allowing an alternative route to the ballot

-

for indigents. The poor candidate who is allowed to get on the ballot
by presenting signed petitions does not suffer "absolute deprivation
of a meaningful opportunity" under Rodriguez.

Therefore, no suspect

wealth classification is involved. A write-in alternative would not
suffice since it does not provide an opportunity to get on the primary
ballot. That is the benefit denied.
The hypothetical scheme -- fairly substantial filing fees with a ]
petition alternative -- would be judged under a rational basis test.

_

Although I think it could survi.that relaxed review, the issue not
free from doubt. One might argue, for example, that the state scheme
is irrational because it allows any kook with money in his pocket to
get on to the ballot and therefore does not further the legitimate
state interest of keeping frivolous candidates, i.~., those without
support, from appearing.
JCJjr
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No. 71-6852

Reoiroulated: ________.__

Donald Paul Lubin, Etc.,
Petitioner,

On Writ of Certiorari t-0 the
Supreme Court of CaliLeonard Panish, Registrarfornia.
llfc~rder, County of
Los Angeles.

v.

[March --, 1074]
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE
the Court.

BuRGEH

delivered the opinion of

We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's claim
that the California statute requirillg payment of a filing
fee of $701.t:iO i11 order t-0 be placed 011 the ballot in the
primary election for nomination to the pu:sition of
Coullty f-iupervi:sor, while pruvidillg no alternative means
of access to the uallot, deprived hittt, as a11 ill(ligent person unable to pay the fee , of the equal prutection
guaranteed by the .FourLee11th Amendmellt a11d rights of
expre:ssion and association guara11teerl by the .First
Amendment.
The ( 'alifornia Election Code provides that forms
required for nomination and election to congressional,
state, and county offices are to be issued to candidates
only upon prepayment of a nonrefundable filing fee.
Cal. Elections Corle ~ ti551. Generally. the required fees
are fixed at a percentage of the salary for the office
sought. The fee for candidates for lf nited ~tates Henator, Governor, and other state offices and some county
offices, is 2% of the annual salary. Candidates for

71-6852-0PINtON
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Representative to Congress, State Senator or Assembly..
man, or for judicial office or district attorney, must pay
1 %- No filing fee is required of candidates in the presidential primary, or for offices which pay either no fixed
salary or not more than $600 annually. Cal. Elections
Code §§ 6551, 6552. and 6554.
Under the California statutes in effect at the time this
suit was commenced, the required candidate filing fees
ranged from $192 for State Assembly, $425 for Congress,
$701.60 for Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors,
$850 for United States Senator, to $982 for Governor.
The California statute provides for the counting of
write-in votes subject to certain conditions. Cal. Elections Code § 18602 et seq. Write-in votes are not
counted, however, unless the person desiring to be a
write-in candidate files a statement to that effect with
the Registrar-Recorder at least eight days prior to the
.election, Cal. Elections Code § 18602, and pays the
requisite filing fee, Cal. Elections Code § 18603. The
latter section provides that "No name written upon a
ballot in any state. county, city, city and county, or
district election shall be counted for an office or nornina"
tion unless ... the fee required by Section 6555 is paid
when the declaration of write-in cttndidacy is filed . . , ."
Cal. Elections Code § 18603. Thus, the contested filing
fees must be satisfied even under the write-in nomination
procedures.
Petitioner with others commenced this class act10n on
February 17, 1972, by petitioning the Los Angeles
Superior Court for a writ of mandate against the Secretary of State and the Los Angeles County RegistrarRecorder. The suit was filed on behalf of petitioner and
all those similarly situated persons who were unable
to pay the filing fees and who desired to be nominated
for public office. In his complaint, petitioner maintained
that he was a citize11 and a voter and that he had sought
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homination as a candidate for membership on the Board
of Supervisors for Los Angeles County.' Petitioner
asserted that on February 15, 1972, he had appeared at
the office of James S. Allison, then Registrar-Recorder of
the County of Los Angeles, to apply for and secure all
necessary nomination papers requisite to his proposed
candidacy. Petitioner was denied the requested nomination papers orally and in writing solely because he was
unable to pay the $701.60 filing fee required of all wouldbe candidates for the office of Board of 8upervisors.
The Los Angeles Superior Court denied the requested
writ of mandate on March 6, 1972. Petitioner alleged
that he was a serious candidate, that he was indigent and
,that he was unable to pay the $701.60 filing fee; no
evidence was taken during the hearing. The superior
court found the fees to be "reasonable, as a matter of
law." Accordingly, the court made no attempt to determine whether the fees charged were necessary to the
State's purpose, or whether the fees, in addition to
deterring some frivolous candidates, also prohibited
serious but indigent candidates from entering their names
on the ballot. The superior court also rejected the
argument that the State was required by Bullock v.
Carte,r, 405 U.S. (1972), to provide an alternative means
of access to the ballot which did not discriminate on the
basis of economic factors.
On March 22, 1972, a second petition for writ of mandate was denied by the Court of Appeals, Second Dist.,
and on March 22, 1972, after the deadline for filing
'nomination papers had passed, the California Supreme
Court denied petitioner's third application for a writ of
mandate.
1 The Board of Suprrvisor~ for Lo~ Angek~ Co11nty i~ thr gowrning body for Los Angrlr~ Co11nty, California. Tlw trrm i~ four year~,
the annual ~alnry $35,080.
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Historically, since the Progressive movement of the
early 20th Century, there has been a steady trend toward
limiting the size of the ballot in "order to concentrate the
attention of the electorate 011 the selection of a much
smaller number of officials and so afford to the voters the
opportunity of exercising more discrimination in their
use of the franchise."~ This desire to limit thr sizr of
the ballot has been variously phrased as a desire to minimize voter coufusion. Thomas"· Mims, 317 F. Supp. 17f).
181 (SD Ala. 1970). to limit tlw number of runoff elections, Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550, 55:1 ( MD
Fla. 1970), to curb "ballot flooding." Jenness ,·. Little,
306 F. Supp. 925. 027 ( XD Ga. H)60), appC'al disnnsscd
sub 11am. Matthews "· Little, 3n7 C S. D4 (1!170). and
to prevent the overwhelming of voting machines-the
modern coull tcrpart of ballot floodi ~1~ Tl' etherillytu,1 \',
Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318. 321 ( MD Fla. 1970). A
majority of States have long required the payment of
some form of filing fee.:' in part to limit the ballot and
iu part to have candidates pay some of the administrative costs.
In sharp contrast to this fear of an unduly lengthy
ballot is an increasiug pressure for broader access to the
ballot. Thus, while progressive thought in the first half
of the century was concerned with restricting the ballot
to achieve voting rationality. recent decades brought au
enlarged demand for an expansio11 of political opportunity. The Twenty-fifth Amendment. the Twenty-sixth
Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act of 1065. 42
U. S. C. ~ 1973 ( 1970), reflect this shift in emphasis.
There has also been a gradual enlargement of the Fourteenth Amendme11 t's equal protection provisions in the
H. Croly, Progrr~~ivr Democra<·~· :289 (1914) .
See 120 U. Pa . L. HeY. 109 (1971), for a detaile<l dr~<'nption of
each State'~ filing fee n·quirernrnt:;,
2

~

I
I
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area of voting rights. Although there is no explicit provision for a right to vote within the text of the Constitution itself,
"It has b<'<'n established i11 recent years that the
Equal Prot<'ction Clause confers thP substantive
right to participat<' on a11 <'qt1al basis with other
qualified vot<'rs wlw11evPr thP State' has adopted .an
clcctora l proc<'SS for dPtPrmi 11i11g who will represent
any segment of thP Stat<'·s population. See, e. (J.,
Reynold::, Y. 8i111s, :177 l'. Si' Pi33; Kramer v. Unio1i
School Distri:ct, 3f!5 l·. S. (i21; /)u1111 ,·. Blumstein,
405 l'. S. :3;30, ;~:16." Sa11 A11to11io School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 F. S. l, 39 JI. 2 (l!l73) (Stewart, J.,
COllCI I rri1 lg),
This ptfoeiple flowF: 11aturally from our recognition that
"legislators ar<~ <'lt'cted by voters . not farms or citios
or ('COllOlllic inter('Sts. As loug as ours is a representative fonn of governme11t, a11d our legislatures
arc thos<' instruments of gov<'rnment elected directly
Ly and dir<'ctly representative of the people, the
right to elect kgislators in a free and unimpaired
fashion is a lwdrol'k of our political system.'' Reynolds \". Sims, 377 l'. S. ,>33, 5u2 (H)o4) ( Warren,
C. J.).
The present caf'<' drawi; thesP two means of achieving
au <'ffective. rcpresP11tativP political syst<'.111 illto apparent
coi1ftict. The p<'titio11<'r stated 011 oath that he is without assets or income and cannot pay the $70Ui0 filing
fee although he is otherwise legally <'ligible to b<:' a candidate OJI the prilllary ballot. 1:1ince his affidavit of iudigency stat<'s that he has 110 resources and earned no
income whatPver i11 Hl72. it would appear that he would
make tlw sa111e clai1n wlwther the filing fcp had bePn fixed
at $1.00. $100.00, or $700.00. The State accepts this as
true but defends the statutory fee as necessary to keep

,

'
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the ballot from being overwhelmed with frivolous or non ..
serious candidates, arguing that as to indigents the filing
fee is not intended as a test of his pocketbook but the
extent of his political support and hence the seriousness
of his candidacy.
In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) 4 we recognized that the State's · interest in keeping its ballots
within (manageable, understandable limits is of the
highest rder. 405' U. S., at 144-145. -The Supreme
d"ourt of California has noted that
"The role of the primary electioh process in California is underscore<l by its importance as a component of the total electoral process and its special
function to assure that fragmentation of voter choice
is minimized. That function is served, not frustrated, by a procedure that tends to regulate the
filing of frivolous candidates. A procedure inviting
or permitting every citizel1 to present himself to the
voters on the ballot without son).e means of measuring the seriousness of the desire and motivation
would make rational voter choices more difficult
because of the size of the ballot and hence tend to
impede the electoral process. .That no device can
be conjured to eliminate every frivolous candidacy
does not undermine the state's effort to eliminate as
4

Bullock, of rour,;e, doe,; not completely rrsolve the present attack
upon the California election statutes because it involved filing fees
that wt>rr so patently exclusionary as to violate rven traditional
equal protection notion,; of reasonablene~s . Cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 760 (197:3); Ja'mes v. Strange , 407 ll . S. 128 ;
Rinaldi v. Yeager. 384 U. S. 305. Uuder attack in Bullock was a
Texas :,;ta tute 1hat rrquired eandida t cs to pay a flat fee of fifty
dollars plus thrir pro rnta :,;hare of the rosts of the Plection in order
to g<'t on thr primary ballot. C. 492, § 186 (1951) Tex. Laws ll681169 (Trx. Election Code Art. 1:3.07 (Supp. 1971 ). The assessment
of co~ts involved :,Um8 a~ high a~ $8,900.

.,,·
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inany such as possible." In re McGee, 36 Cal. 2d
592, 226 P. 2d (1951).
This legitimate state interest, however, must be
achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual
candidate's equally important interest in the continued
availability of political opportunity. The interests
involved are not merely those of parties or individual
candidates; the voters can assert their preferences only
through candidates or parties or both and it is this broad
interest that must be weighed in the balance. The right
of a party or an individual to a place on a ballot is
entitled to protection and is intertwined with the rights
rof voters.
"The right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote·
may be cast only for one of two parties at a timewhen other parties are clamoring for a place 011 the·
ballot." 1Yilliarns v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30'
( 1968).
This must also mean that the right to vote is "heavily
burdened" if that vote may be ca'st only for one of two
candidates in a primary election 'a t a time when other
candidates are clamoring for a i)lace on the ballot. J t
is to be expected that a voter hopes to find on the ballot
a candidate who comes near to reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary issues. This does not mean
every voter can be assured that a candidate to his liking
will he on the ballot, but the process of qualifying candidates for a place on the ballot may not constitutionally
be solely measured in dollars.
In Bullock, supra, we expressly rejected the validity of'
·filing fees as the sole means of determining a candidate's
·" seriousness":
"To say that the filing fee requirement tends to limit
the ballot to the more serious candidates is no~

,,
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enough. There may ·well be some ratio11al relation ..
ship between a candidate's willingness to pay a filing
fee and the seriousness with which he takes his candidacy. [ footnote omitted] but the candidates in this
case affirmatively alleged that they were unable, not
simply unwilling, to pay the assessed fees and there
was no contrary evidence, It is uncontested that
the filing fees exclude legitimate as well as frivolous
candidates . . . . If the Texas fee requirement is
intended to regulat<> the ballot by weeding out
spurious candidates. it is extraordinarily ill-fitted to
that goal; [footnote omittedl other means to protect
those valid interests are available." 405 U. S., at
145-146.
Filing fees, however large, do not, in and of themselves,
test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the
voter support of an aspirant for public office. A large
filing fee may serve the legitimate function of keeping
ballots manageablerfUt standi11g alone it is not a certain
test of whether the candidacy is serious or spurious. A
wealthy candidate with not the remotest chance of election may secure a place on the ballot by writing a check.
Merchants and other entrepreneurs have been kllown to
run for public office simply to make their names known
to the public. We have also noted that prohibitive filing
fees. such as those in Bullock can effectively exclude
serious candidates. Conversely, if the filing fee is more
moderate. as here, inpecunious but sincere candidates
may be prevented from running. Even in this day of
high budget political campaigns some candidates have
demonstrated that direct contact with thousands of
voters by "walking tours" is a route to success. Whatever may be the political mood at any given time, our
tradition has been one of hospitality toward -al candi-. )

'
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'dates without regard to their c•conornic status. Cf.
Thomas v. Mims, 817 Supp. 17D (i--,0 Ala. Hl70).
The exclusionary nature of th<· California system is
compoumled by the> abst•nc(' of any alternative mealls of
gaining accc>ss to the ballot. As we have 11otc>d. tlw payment of a fpp is an absulutr not an alt('I'llative condition,
and failurf' to n1ef't it is a disqualificatio11 fro111 ru11ni11g
for oflic<'. Thus. California has chosen to achieve the
legitimatE· i11tcrest of 111a111taini11g the integrity of elections by means which operate to excludt• poor but poten~
tially serious ca1Hlidates from the ballot without providing them ,Yith any alternative m<•ans of com.ing befon~
the voters. f-;d<'ctio11 of candidates solely 011 tlw basis
of ability to pay a fixC>d fili11g foe without providing any
altrrnatiw means is not rPasonably necessary to the
acomplishrncnt of the ~tatP's leg)t1111at<' electio11 interests.
Accordingly, we hold that in the absenc<' of rPasonable
alternative means of ballot access. a State may not 1
consistent. with Pqual protection requirements. impose
candidate filing fres.
In so holding. ,v<> note that tlwre are obviou::; and well
known nwans of tPsti 11g tlw "seriousness" of a candidacy
which do not m<>asure the probability of attracting
significant voter support solely by the llt-'Utral fact of
payment of a filing ft'l'. States may, for Pxample. impose
on minor political parties the burden of demo11strating
the cxisteuce of voter support by requiring such parties
to file 1wtitious for a placr~ 011 the ballot sigllecl by a
percentage of those who voted in a prior election. Hee
American Porty of 'l'e.ras ,·. White, ~o. 72-887 (decide({
March.) Hl74). i-iimilarly. a calldidat<-> who establishe'8
that he cannot pay the fili11g foe required for a place on
the primary ballot rnay be• re>quin--d to demonstrate the
"scrious11c>ss'' of his candidacy by persuading a substantial number of voters. to sign a pPtition in h.is behalf..

71-6852-0PINION
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The point, of course, is that ballot access must be genuinely open to all ubject to reasonable requirements.
Jennes v. Fortson, 402 U. S. 431 , 439 (1971) . California's present system has not met this standard.
Reversed and remanded for further consideration not
inconsistent with this opinion.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

March 8, 1974
/

Re:

No. 71-6852 - Lubin v. Panish

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
·-·.'

Copies to Conference

QJcurt cf tlrt ~nit ch ~tntcs
~ 1tsl7ington, ~. QJ. 211,5}1,~

~ltµr tttte

CHAM BERS OF

JU S TI CE P OTTE R S T E W ART

March 8, 1974
I

I

Re: No. 71-6852, Lubin v. Parrish
Dear Chief,

•..
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I·
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My view in this case would require a slightly
narrower holding than that stated in your circulation of
yesterday. Specifically, I would change the final sentence of the first full paragraph on page 9 along the
following lines:
Accordingly, we hold that in the absence
of reasonable alternative means of ballot
access, a State may not, consistent with
the Constitution, impose upon an indigent
a filing fee requirement which, by definition,
he cannot possibly satisfy. Cf. Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371.

',.

jj,

·<:.
,:,j .',:

.·~-

,,.,

.-,.,.

1\.,

.....

_

i

If this view is not acceptable to you and/or to a majority

of the Brethren, I shall simply file a concurring statement
along these lines.
I have one other problem with your circulation -a very minor one. Since I do not think that "reasonableness" is an appropriate measure of validity under the Equal
Protection Clause, and because that word is for me too reminiscent of old-fashioned substantive due process, I would
change the closing words of the first sentence of footnote 4
on page 6 along the following lines:

,.~ ..
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. . . so patently exclusionary as to violate
even traditional concepts of equal protection
of the law.
Sincerely yours,

O<;
·
I.

/

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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March 11, 1974

.,

No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish
•,,'

Dear Chief:
I am certainly with you in the result, and also most of your
opinion circulated March 7.
It does seem to me, however, that the opinion would be
strengthened by greater emphasis on the importance - not merely
the legitimacy - of the state interests involved. Speaking broadly,
the great sttength of democracy in America (certainly until recently)
has been the predominance of the two party system. The fragmentation of political parties has almost destroyed the capacity of many
democracies to govern responsibly. The current impass and
stagnation in Italy is one conspicuous example. France has been
severely weakened by a similar problem. Some of this has now
cropped up in England, and the pattern in many of the other smaller,
so-called democracies is of "coalition government" too weak and
irresponsible to govern effectively. In the end, a rudderless democracy
will become a totalitarian state.
A second, and related interest of genuine significance, is
what you have in mind by use of the term "manageable ballot". This
means, for me, a ballot which is not so cluttered with the names of
unlmown and non-entity candidates as to be unintelligible to the average
voter. If it becomes too easy for a candidate or a party to obtain a
place on the ballot, rational choice by the public will be impossible.
This is a sound reason for requiring a meaningful showing of voter
interest and support before one is allowed a ballot position. Small
filing fees are inefficacious in furthering this interest.
If you agree generally with what I have said, perhaps - before

you recirculate - you will consider making appropriate language changes

,,.
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that emphasize more sharply these two related but quite fundamental
state interests. I am not suggesting any major revision, but rather
language changes at such places as you think appropriate. Perhaps a
footncte also could be added that emphasizes the virtues of our tradition
and history of party responsibility and the dangers of losing this
essential quality if multiple weak parties are allowed to infiltrate
the system - as in the countries mentioned above.

'll)
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•••
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The next case we are likely to have presented here will involve
an attack on the requirement of substantial voter interest and support,
evidenced by petitions, signatures or attendance at conventions. I hope
your opinion will make clear that evidence of substantial support is a
valid and legitimate requirement.
Sincerely,
f. .,;
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To: The Cllicf Just-ice
Mr. Justice Dougla 5
Mr. Ji;.,tlce Brennan
Mr. Justice SvtV1.r·t
Mr, Just ice \/,.ii. to
Mr. Justice har~1 ~l l
Mr, Justice Powel 1 ~
Mr. Justice Renr 41 st

ln DIUJ'T

SUPREME COURT 01f THE UNITEif~ATES"
Ciroulatt.J:

No. 71- 6852
Recirculated:
Donald Paul Luhi11. Etc.,
Petitioner,

v.
l,co11ard Pa11ish. Regi1:,trarHecorrlcr. Cou11ty of
Lo::: Allg('\('H.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of California.

fl\Tnreh --, 19741

M1e . .Jt'wnc•:

BLACKMUN. co1wuning in 1,art.

For JUC', th<' rliffi{'ulty with thC' ( 'alifornia <'lt:>ction system is thC' abseil<'<' of a realistic alternative access to the
ballot for the candidate whos<> indigen{'y rend<'rs it impossible• for him to pay the prescribed filing fN'.
I would regard a writ<'-ill pro{'edure. frpe of f<'C', as an
acceptabk alt<>rnatiV<'. Prior to HlH8, Califomia allowed
this. and wtitf'-i11 votes wen' C\OU11t,ed , although no prior
fee had been paid. But th<' prior fep l'('quirernent for
the writc•-in candidate' wa~ i11corporatt'd into the State's
Election Code in that year, Laws H)G8, c. 79. ~ 3. and
is now ~ 18603 (b) of the Code', Tt is that addition. by
amendment, that servrs to deny the petitiouer the equal
protection guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 18603 ( b) appears to be severable. See
Frost ,·. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U. R. 515, 525-526
(1929); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 341-342 (1921).
The Code itself provides for sevnability. ~ 48.
I would hold that the California e]('ction statutes are
unconstitutional insofar as they presently d<'ny access to
the ballot. If ~ 186Cla ( b) were to he Ftricken. the Code,
as before, would permit write-in ac{'ess with no prior fee.
The presence of that alternative would then sC'rw all

.n, J

71- fo,.'i:!- ( '( )\'( 'l 'H

J.l'BI\ ,· . l'.\\'l:·m

that is d(•111a11d,•d hy th<· I•:qual Pl'ott•ctiun ( 'hlUHl'. I ,
tlwrdor<'. joi11 tht' Court i11 t'C'\'<'rsi11g tlw unlt-•r uf the
:-iupre,11<' Court of California dP11yi11g pPtitio11<·l'·~ 1wtitio11
for writ of nm1Hla111us.
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.®ttµ-rrmc QJ.om·t i1f tlrc ';lllnitch .§taf:tt1
~11WI1ingtan, J. QJ. 2rt.?n~
CHAMBERS OF

JU ST I CE WM . J . BFIENNAN.JR.

RE: No. 71-6852

.
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March 12, 1974

..

Lubin v. Panish

Dear Chief:
I agree with Potter's suggestions in his note to
you of March 8. May I add another? Would you consider
deleting the sentence at the top of page 5 - 11 Although
there is no explicit provision for a right to vote within the text of the Constitution itself.
As I think you
know, I have the view that that protection is found in
the First Amendment. I think the deletion may be made
without interrupting the flow of the opinion. If you
decide to make Potter's changes and the deletion I suggest, I am happy to join the opinion. Otherwise,
would you please record me at the foot of the opinion
as concurring in the result.
11

·.

,<,

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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.:§u.p-rrmt QJ01trt of tlft ~nitth .:§tctfrg
~a$frittgfott, ~- QJ. 20p'1;J
CHAMBERS OF

/

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 13, 1974
I
I

Re:

No. 71-6852 - Lubin v. Panish

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

.<

Mr. Justice Blackmun ,
Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
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71-6,'l)2 L11bi n v. Po.nlr,h
·---·----'
----·- --··------··
Dea· Chief :

...
Steuart in his iremo to you of Vie. rch 8,
197)1. c. nri the P0.c.U·L,i0nal o!1c ra.i:::e,l.. i.w

13ill Dremmn ln hin memo to yon ot Hcrd1
12, 197)1 state junt a.l>out rw v.iewn; ::1nd
if ~,ou felt free to rev j r;c you1· cnx·1:i (:r

hqri:-iy ~o jo:i.n yo"Lix or,in.i.on.

Will.i.m.1

o.

Dm c;J.~:c.

'.i:lle Cilicf J'u:.:t.i C<'
cc :

'.i'J1c Con:i.'crcncc·

.·~'· '

,jnp:rmu <l}ourt of tlft :Juittb .itatt•

lfultin¼lhtn, Jl. <q.

20~~,

CHAM91!:RS 0,-

THE CHIEF' JUSTICE

March 14, 1974

Re:

No. 71 - 6852 - Lubin v. Panish

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

A second draft of the above will be in your hands soon.
It will (?) satisfy almost everyone.

Reg?);

j)Ullrrntt <qcttrt of tqe ~ttittlt j)tatts-

Jln¼'fltmgtttn. ~. QJ. 2llffe'-l~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

March 20,

197!1-

/

Dear Chief:

In 71-6852 , Lubin v. Panish :please
join me in your circulation of I•:arch 19,

1974.

WiD_iam O. Douglas

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

;

_ju.µ:re1nc {q01trl cf tlrc J.;111fhh ,§tufl'g

'JM'aulyhighrn, i!).

<q. 20bJJ1.;:t

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR .

March 20, 1974

RE: No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish

Dear Chief:
I agree with your circulation of
March 19 in the above case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

,iu.pumt <lfourl of tltt ~ b .jtatt•
Jhtalfinghtu. J. QJ. 21lffe'*t1
CHAMl!IERS 01'"

THE CHIEF' JUSTICE

Re:

March 21, 1974

No. 71-6852 - Lubin v. Panis h

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Since I sent the second draft of the opinion in the above
case, I have discovered that there is a case pending in at least
one state that involves possible constitutional challenges to a
ballot which does not rotate the names of the candidates $iving
each one an equal chance to be listed first. In view of this and
other related considerations, I think the reference to that subject should be deleted from footnote 5 on pages 10 and 11 so that
the .following language would be stricken from the .footnote:
"There is strong evidence, for example, that
a candidate's chances of victory are significantly
affected by the position his name occupies on the
ballot. See Note, California Ballot Position
Statutes: An Unconstitutional Advantage to Incumbents, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 365 (1972). That study
concluded that the candidate whose name appears
first on the ballot is the beneficiary o.f a substantial positional advantage and that 'one can attribute
at least a five percent increase in the first listed
candidate's vote total to a positional basis.' It
would reasonably follow that a candidate whose
nam.e appears anywhere on the ballot has a significant advantage over a candidate who must depend
on write-in votes. 11

.§iqri-tmt <!Jou.rt of tfyt ~ttittb .§tatta
'J)'aG!yingtott. t{l. QJ. 2llffeJ~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 21, 1974

71-6852 - Lubin v. Panish
Dear Chief,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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.®1tt1ttltU' QJoud cf tltt 'Jlfoibb $,taua
1Dai.lJrington, W. QJ. 20~'1~
CHAMBERS OF

March 21, 197 4

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

.

>

Re: No. 71-6852 -- Lubin v. Panish

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

r/~-1-

.

,\

·'

T.M.
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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'.'

March 21, 1974

No. 71-6852

Lubin v. Panish

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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